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Abstract

1 Introduction

Tripwire is an integrity checking program written for Tripwire is an integrity checking program written for
the UNIX environment. It gives system administra- the UNIX environment that gives system administrators the ability to monitor file systems for added, tors the ability to monitor file systems for added,
deleted, and modified files. Imended to aid intru- deleted, and modified files. Intended to aid intrusion detection, Tripwire was officially released on sion detection, Tripwire was officially released on
November 2, 1992. It is being actively used at thou- November 2, 1992,1 and is being actively used at
sands of sites around the world. Published in vol- thousands of sites around the world. Published in
ume 26 of camp. sources. Wlix on the USENET volume 26 of comp. sources. unix and archived
and archived at numerous FIP sites around the world, at numerous FfP sites around the world, Tripwire is
Tripwire is widely available and widely distributed. widely available and widely distributed. It is now
It is recommended by various computer security re- recommended by many computer security response
sponse teams, including the CERT and CIAC.
teams, including the ARPA Computer Emergency
Response
Team (CERn.
This paper begins by motivating the need for an in·

tegrity checker by presenting a hypothetical situation
any system administrator could face. An overview of
Tripwire is then described, emphasizing the salient
aspects ofTripwire configuration that supports its use
at sites employing modem variants of the UNIX operating system. Experiences with how Tripwire has
been used in "in the field" are then presented, along
with some conjectures on the prevalence and extent
of system breakins. Novel uses of Tripwire and notable configurations of Tripwire are also presented.
"This paper appeared as [8]

Testing of Tripwire started in September 1992.
Since then, its design and code have been available
for scrutiny by the public at large. The design and
implementation are described in detail in [6].
An intensive beta test period resulted in Tripwire
being ported to over two dozen variants of UNIX,
including several versions neither author had ever
encountered. Currently entering its seventh (and
possibly last) revision, Tripwire has met our design
goals of being sufficiently portable, scalable, config·
lThal release date was chosen for its historical significance
as well as being convenient to our devclopmenlschedule.

urable, flexible, extensible, secure, manageable, and
malleable to enjoy widespread use.
This paper documents some of our experiences
and discoveries based on our development and use
of Tripwire. It begins by motivating the use of an
integrity checking tool (such as Tripwire) through
the presentation of a hypothetical scenerio that a
UNIX system administrator could face. Next, we
present an overview of Tripwire's design, emphasizing the salient configuration aspects that allow its use
in modem UNIX variants. We then discuss experiences gathered from Tripwire users since its September 1992 release. These stories seem to confirm the
practicality of this integrity checking scheme. There
are at least seven documented cases of Tripwire notifying system administrators of intruders' system
tampering. We present our conjectures on the prevalence and extent of system breakins based on our
data. We also describe novel uses of Tripwire and
surprising configurations that have been reported to
us. Feedback that has shaped the direction of Tripwire development is also presented.

Ellen thought she was the only one with the root password. Needless to say, this was not something Ellen
was happy to see.
A bit more investigation revealed that someonecertainly not Ellen - had logged on as root, not only
on her machine but also on several other machines in
her company. Unfortunately, the intruder deleted all
the accounting and audit files just before logging out
of each machine. Ellen suspects that the intruder (or
intruders) ran the compiler and editor on several of
the machines. Being concerned about security, Ellen
is worried that the intruder may have thus changed
one or more system files, thus enabling future unauthorized access as well as compromising sensitive
information. How can she tell which files have been
altered without restoring each system from backups?
Poor Ellen is faced with one of the most tedious and
frustrating jobs a system administrator can have determining which, if any, files and programs have
been altered without authorization. File modifications may occur in a number of ways: an intruder,
an authorized user violating local policy or controls,
or even the rare piece of malicious code altering system executables as others are run. It might even be
the case that some system hardware or software is
silently cOirupting vital system data.

Tripwire stands as an example how a simple idea
can be developed into a general and effective tool to
enhance UNIX security while also posing almost no
threat to the systems under guard. Unlike programs
like password crackers or naw probes, Tripwire canIn each of these situations, the problem is not so
not be turned against a system to identify or exploit much knowing that things might have been changed;
weaknesses or flaws. It is also an example of how a rather, the problem is verifying exactly which files
program may have uses unanticipated by its authors. - out of tens of thousands of files in dozens of
gigabytes of disk on dozens of different architectures
- might have been changed. Not only is it necessary
2 Motivation
to examine every one of these files, but it is also
necessary to examine directory information as well.
2.1 A cautionary tale2
Ellen will need to check for deleted or added files,
too. With so many different systems and files, how
Ellen runs a network of 50 networked UNIX comput- is Ellen going to manage the situation?
ers representing nearly a dozen vendors - from PCs
Resolving such a situation would prove tedious
running Xenix to aCray running Unicos. This morning, when she logged in to her workstation, Ellen and labor-intensive for even the most well-prepared
was a bit surprised when the lastlog message in- system administrator. Consider the problems facing
dicated that root had logged into the system at 3 AM. system administrators who use simple checklisting
schemes:
Urhis is taken from [7].
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2.2

The resulting challenges

tion should include a simple way to describe portions
of the filesystem to be traversed. Additionally, in
cases where files are likely to be added, changed,
or deleted, it must be easy to update the checklist
database. For instance. files such as t etctmotd
may change daily or weekly. It should not be necessary to regenerate the entire database every time this
single file changes to maintain database accuracy.

Established techniques for monitoring file systems
for potentially dangerous changes include maintaining checklists, compaTison copies, checksum
records, or a long history of backup tapes for this
kind of contingency [4. 2J. However, these methods
are costly to maintain, prone to error, and susceptible
to easy spoofing by a malicious intruder.

Ideally, our integrity checking program could be
run regularly from cron (8) to enable detection of
file changes in a timely manner. It should also be possible to run the program manually to check a smaller
set of files for changes. As the administrator is likely
to compare the differences between the "base" checklist and the current file list frequently, it is important
that the program be easy to invoke and use.

For instance, the UNIX utility find (1) is often used to generate a checklist of system files, perhaps in conjunction with 1s (1). This list is then
saved and compared using di f f (1) to detennine
which files have been added or deleted, and to find
which files have conflicting modification times, ownership, or sizes. An added level of security could
be added by augmenting these lists with infonnation from sum (8) or cksum (8) , as is done by the
crc..£heck program included with COPS [3J.

A useful integrity checker must generate output
that is easy to scan. A checker generating three
hundred lines of output from each machine for the
system administrator to analyze daily would be self~
defeating - this is far too much to ask of even
the most amazingly dedicated system administratod
Thus. the program must allow the specification of
filesystem "exceptions" that can change without being reported, and hence reduce "noise." For example, changes in system log file sizes are expected,
but a change in inode number, ownership, or file
modes is cause for alann. However, a change in
any value stored in the inodes (except for the access
timestamp) for system binaries in tbin should be
reported. Properly specified, the integrity checker
should operate unobtrusively, nmifying Ellen when
a file changes outside the specified bounds, and otherwise running quietly.

However, numerous shortcomings in these simple
checklisting schemes prevent them from being completely trustworthy and useful. First, the list of files
and associated checksums may be tedious to maintain because of its size. Second, using timestamps,
checksums, and file sizes does not necessarily ensure
the integrity of each file (e.g., once intruders gain
root privileges, they may alter timestamps and even
the checklists at will). Furthermore, changes to a file
may be made without changing its length or checksum generated by the sum (8) program. And this
entire approach presumes that Is (1) , sum (8) , and
the other programs have not been compromised! In
the case of a serious attack, a conscientious administrator needs stronger proof that important files have
remained unchanged. But what proof can be offered
Finally, assuming that Ellen wants to run the inthat is sufficient for this situation?
tegrity checker on every machine in her network, the
integrity checker should allow the reuse and sharing
of configuration files wherever possible. For exam2.3 The resulting wishIist
ple, if Ellen has twenty identical workstations, they
A successful integrity checking scheme requires a should be able to share a common configuration file,
high level of automation - both in generating the but allowing machine-specific oddities (i.e., some
output list and in generating the input list of files. If software package installed on only one machine).
the scheme is difficult to use, it may not be used often The configuration should thus support selective reuse
enough - or worse, used improperly. The automa- to reduces the opportunity for operator error.
3

3

Tripwire design

tries in tw. config can be directories, each entry
can map to many entries in the database.

The criteria we describe above represent the motivation for some of the key design issues behind Tripwire. Ultimately, the goal of Tripwire is to detect and
notify system administrators of changed, added, and
deleted files in some meaningful and useful manner.
However, the success of such a tool depends on how
well it works within the realities oftheadministmtion
environment. This includes appropriate flexibility to
fit a range of security policies, portability to different
platfonns in the same administrative realm, and ease
of use.

3.1

In integrity checking mode, Tripwire reads the
tw. conf ig file and generates a new database.
Tripwire then compares this database with the baseline, producing a list of added and deleted files. For
those files that have changed, the selection mask
is applied to detennine whether a report should
be generated. Note that the selection mask stored
in the baseline database is used, not the one in
tw. config, based on the premise that the base
database has been stored on some secure media (e.g.,
read-only floppy).
When files change for legitimate reasons and
no longer match the baseline database description,
updating the baseline database becomes necessary.
Tripwire offers two modes to ensure database consistency. In database update mode, Tripwire is given
a list of files or configuration entries on the command
line. The database entries for these files are regenerated, and a new database written out. Tripwire
then instructs the system administrator to move this
database to secure media. In interacti ve database
update mode, Tripwire first generates a list of all
changes (ala integrity checking mode). For each of
these changes, Tripwire then asks the system administrator whether the specified file or entry should be
updated.

Component overview

A high level model of Tripwire operation is shown
in Figure 1. This shows how the Tripwire program
uses two inputs: a configuration describing the file
system objects to monitor, and a database of previously generated signatures putatively matching the
configuration.

In its simplest fonn, the configuration file contains
a list of files and directories to be monitored, along
with their associated selection mask (i.e., the list of
attributes that can be safely ignored if changed). The
database file is generated by Tripwire, containing a
list of entries with filenames, inode attribute values,
signature infonnation, selection masks, and the configuration file entry that generated it.
3.3

3.2

Scalability aids

Tripwire includes an M4-like preprocessing language
[5] to help system administrators maximize reuse
of configuration files. By including directives such
as u@@include", "@@ifdef", "@@ifhost", and
"@@define", system administrators can write a
core configuration file describing portions of the file
system shared by many machines. These core files
can then be conditionally included in the configuration file for each machine.

Modes of Operation

In the four (mutually exclusive) modes of Tripwire
operation, program operation is driven by the contents of the configuration file, tw. config. Each
mode is described in tum below.

In database initialization mode, Tripwire generates a baseline database containing entries for every
file specified in the configuration file, tw. config.
To allow the possible use of Tripwire at sites conEach database entry contains the filename, inode attributes, signature infonnation, its selection mask, sisting of thousands of machines, configuration and
and the configuration entry that generated it. As en- database files do not need to reside on the actual machine. Input can be read from fi Ie descriptors, open at
4

apply
Ignore-masks

Figure 1: Diagram of high level operation model of Tripwire
the time of Tripwire invocation. These file descriptors can be connected to UNIX pipes or network connections. Thus, a remote server or a local program
can supply the necessary file contents. Supporting
UNIX style pipes also allows for outside programs to
supply encryption and compression services - services that we do not anticipate includingas a standard
part of the core Tripwire package.

mmlstrators can write Tripwire configuration files
that support numerous configurations of machines.
Unifonn and unique machines are similarly handled.
This helps support reuse and minimize user overhead
in installation.
The configuration file for Tripwire, tw. config,
contains a list of entries, enumerating the set of directory (or files) to be monitored for changes, additions, or deletions. Associated with each entry is
a selection-mask (described in the next section) that
describes which file (inode) attributes can change
without being reported as an exception. An excerpt
from aset of tw. config entries is shown in Figure
2.

Tripwire does not encrypt the database file so as to
ensure that runs can be completely automated (i.e.,
no one has to type in the encryption key every night
at 3 AM). Because the database contains nothing
that would aid an intruder in subverting Tripwire,
this does not undermine the security of the system.
However, ifTripwire is used in an environment where
Prefixes to the tw . config entries allow for prunthe database is encrypted as a matter of policy, the ing (i.e., preventing Tripwire from recursing into the
interface supports this, as described above.
specified directory or recording a database entry for
a file). Both inclusive and non-inclusive pruning are
supported;
that is, a directory's contents only may be
3.4 Conligurabilityaids
excluded from monitoring, or the directory and its
Tripwire makes a distinction between the configura- contents may both be excluded.
tion file and the database file. Each machine may
By default, all entries within a named directory are
share a configuration file, but each generates its own included when the database is generated. Each entry
database file. Thus, identically configured machines is recorded in the database with the same flags and
can share their configuration database, but each has signatures as the enclosing, specified directory. This
its integrity checked against a per-machine database. allows the user to write more compact and inclusive
Because of the preprocessor support, system ad- configuration files. Some users have reported using
5

# file/dir
selection-mask
letc
R
# all files under letc
@@ifhost solaria.cs.purdue.edu
!/etc/lp
# except for SVR4 printer logs
@@endif
R+12
!etc/passwd
# you can't be too careful
letc/mtab
L
# dynamic files
!etc/motd
L
!etc!utrnp
L
=!var!tmp
# only the directory, not its contents
R

Figure 2: An excerpt from a tw _config file
configuration files of a simple I, naming all entries
Any files differing from their database entries are
in the file system!
then interpreted according to their selection-masks.
The tw. config file also contains the names If any attributes are to be monitored, the filename is
of files and directories with their associated printed, as are the expected and actual values of the
selection-mask. A selection-mask may look like: inode attributes. An example of Tripwire output for
+pinugsm12-a. Flags are added ("+") or deleted changed files is shown in Figure 3.
("-") from the set of items to be examined.

A "quiet option" is also available through a
command-line option to force Tripwire to give terse
output. The output when running in this mode is
suitable for use by filter programs. This allows for
an external script to execute automated actions if desired. One example would be to use the terse output
of Tripwire after a breakin to quickly make a backup
tape of only changed files, to be examined later.

Tripwire reads this as, "Report changes in permission and modes, inode number, number of links, user
id, group id, size of the file, modification timestamp,
and signatures 1 and 2. Disregard changes to access
timestamp."

A flag exists for every distinct field stored in an
inode. Provided is a set of templates to allow system
By allowing reporting to be dictated by local poladministrators to quickly classify files into categories
icy,
Tripwire can be used at sites with a very broad
that use common sets of flags:
range of security policies.
• read-only files Only the access timestamp is
ignored.
3.5

Signature support

• log files Changes to the file size, access and Tripwire has a generic interface to "signature3" roumodification timestamp, and signatures are ig- tines and supports up to ten signatures to be used for
nored.
each file. The following default methods are included
• growing log files Changes to the access and in the latest Tripwire distribution: MD5[11] (the
modification timestamp, and signatures are ig- RSA Data Security, Inc. MD5 Message-Digest Algorithm), MD4[1O] (the RSA Data Security, Inc. MD4
nored. Increasing file sizes are ignored.
Message-Digest Algorithm), MD2 (the RSA Data
• ignore nothing self-explanatory
3We use Ihe term signature to include checksums, message
digests, secure hash functions, andlorcryplographic signatures.

• ignore everything self-explanatory
6

changed: -rw-r--r-- root
20 Sep 17 13:46:43 1993 /.rhosts
### Attr
Observed (what it is)
Expected (what it should be)
###

=========== ============================= =============================

/.rhosts
st_mtime:
st_ctime:

Fri Sep 17 13:46:43 1993
Fri Sep 17 13:46:43 1993

Tue Sep 14 20:05:10 1993
Tue Sep 14 20:05:10 1993

Figure 3: Sample Tripwire output for a changed file

Security, Inc. MD2 Message-Digest Algorithm),4 4 Experiences
Snefru [9] (the Xerox Secure Hash Function), and
SHA (the NIST proposed Secure Hash Algorithm). Since the initial Tripwire release in November 1992,
Tripwire also includes POSIX 1003.2 compliant seven subsequent versions have been released to inCRC-32 and CCIlT compliant CRC-16 signatures. corporate bug fixes, support additional platfonns,and
Each signature may be included in the selection- add new features. The authors estimate Tripwire is
mask by including its index. Because each signature being actively used at several thousand sites around
routine presents a different balance in the equation the world. Retrievals of the Tripwire distribution
between perfonnance and security, the system ad~ from our FTPserverinitiallyexceeded 300 per week.
ministrator can tailor the use of signatures according Currently, seven months after the last official patch
to local policy. By default, MD5 and Snefru signa- release, we see an average of 25 fetches per week.
tures are recorded and checked for each file. How- This does not include the copies being obtained from
ever, different signatures can be specified for each the many FTP mirror sites around the net.
and every file. This allows the system administrator
We have received considerable feedback on Tripgreat flexibility in what to scan, and when.
wire design, implementation, and use. We believe
that
version 1.1 ofTripwire has succeeded in meeting
Also included in the Tripwire distribution is
most
of the goals of system administrators needing
siggen, a program that generates signatures for
the files specified on the command line. This tool an integrity checking tool.
provides a convenient means of generating any of
In this section, we present feedback from system
the included signatures for any file.
administrators that seem to validate the workability
of
integrity checkers and present conjectures on the
The code for the signature generation functions
is written with a very simple interface. Thus, Trip- prevalence and extent of system breakins. We also
wire can be customized to use additional signature prevent novel uses of Tripwire and surprising configroutines, including cryptographic checksum methods urations that have been reported to us. Feedback that
and per-site hash-code methods. Tripwire has room has shaped the direction of Tripwire development is
for 10 functions, and only seven are preassigned, as also presented.
above.

4.1

4The copyright on the available code for MD-2 suiClly limits
its use to privacy-enhanced mail functions. RSA Data Security,
Inc. has kindly given us pennission to include MD-2 in the
Tripwire package without funher reslriClion or royalty.

First, the good news...

We have gathered reports of at least seven cases
where Tripwire has alerted system administrators to
intruders tampering with their systems. In at least
two of these cases, the penetration was widespread,
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with numerous system programs and libraries replaced with trojan horses.

1992, the small number of reported incidents
could be explained away. However, this is not
consistent with the reports from response teams
and the frequent advisories reporting newly dis~
covered system vulnerabilites being exploited
by intruders.

Potentially less exciting than these stories, but
equally inspiring, are the dozens of stories we have
received of sites using Tripwire as a system administration enforcement tool. System administrators report having found hundreds of program binaries changed, only to find that another person with
system-level access had made the changes without
following local notification policy.

• The sites running Tripwire are not interesting:
if sites running Tripwire offer nothing of interest to an intruder, then one would expect few
breakin attempts. However, given that some of
the highest-profile UNIX sites in the nation (e.g.,
public access UNIX sites, government information servers, military sites) are running Tripwire,
this seems implausible.

There has also been one reported case of a system
administrator detecting a failing disk with Tripwire.
The normal system logging reporting the failure was
not read very often by the system administrator, but
the Tripwire output was surveyed daily.

• The site admins are not telling: it may be the
case that system administrators at sites where
breakins have occurred are not willing to tell us
that they have been sucessfully attacked. This is
possible considering the nature of many of the
sites running Tripwire, but we would expect at
least a few reports to be made in confidence.

All three classes of stories validate the theory
behind integrity checking programs. Although the
foundations of integrity checkers in UNIX security
have been discussed in [I, 2, 4], when Tripwire de~
sign was started in May 1992, no usable, publically
available integrity tools existed - providing one of
the primary motivations for writing Tripwire.

4.1.1

• The sites are more security-conscious: if system
administrators running Tripwire are also considerably more successful in securing their systems than other UNIX sites, intruders would find
known vulnerabilities corrected, greater than
usual protection measures employed, and more
vigilance from system administrators. This
would explain the low number of reported intrusion incidents from a sample made up exclusively of sites running Tripwire.

Where are all the bad guys?

The dramatically increased number of network
breakins throughout the Internet in early 1994 presented an opportunity to compare the prevalence of
system breakins at sites running Tripwire with those
sites that did not. s
One of us (Spafford) posted a query on USENET
asking whether any sites running Tripwire were successfully subverted as described in the CERT advisory. Surprisingly, no system administrator at any
site reported such a breakin. Why? Furthermore, out
of the thousands of machines running Tripwire, why
have we heard of only seven Tripwire-discovered
breakins since 1992? We offer some possibilities:

• The sites have already been attacked: the Tripwire baseline database should be generated from
a clean distribution; one that is assured to be free
of trojan horses,logic bombs, etc. This usually
means reinstalling the operating system from
vendor-supplied media. However, this is often prohibitively inconvenient. If databases are
being generated on machines already compromised, then Tripwire will have been installed
too late to have reported those critical file tamperings. If this is the case, then many sites have

• The intruders have given up: if the competence
and ambition of intruders have dropped since
sSee, in particular, CERT advisory CA-94:01 dated February
3,1994.
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not reported breakins because they continue to (signatures are stored in base 64), self-contained (all
the database infonnation is encapsulated in a single
be unaware of them.
file), and individual entries can be checked using the
• The intruders have completely subverted insiggen program.
tegrity checking schemes: changed files are
usually detected through the use of file signatures. An intruder could be modifying files 4.1.2 How about the good guys?
in such a way that the resulting files preserve
"The mark of a good tool is that it is used
their original signatures. However, Tripwire inin
ways that its author never thought oJ"
cludes seven signature routines, and the choice
6

of which signatures are used for any file is not
fixed. That an intruder could be using such a
As noted previously, many system administrators
technique is possible, but the possibility is so
are using Tripwire primarily as a tool to enforce local
small as to be almost nonexistant.
policy. When system administration duties are deleOf the conjectures offered, the supposition most gated among numerous people, changes made by one
credible is that system administrators who run Trip- person often go unnoticed and unexplained to others.
wire represent a poor sample for determining system Running Tripwire allows these changes to be noticed
breakins. A substantial portion of the thousands of in a timely manner-a goal very similar to intrusion
Tripwire e-mail messages we have received under- detection.
score the competence and paranoia of these system
Another application we note uses Tripwire to
administrators.
help salvage file systems not completely repaired by
However, despite these system administrators'
best intentions, their lack of available, trusted signatures for critical operating system files is especially
noteworthy. Instead of installing a system from distribution media, they typically choose a machine that
they believe is "clean," using it to generate the baseline database. This assumption, however, may be
completely ungrounded. We know of at least one
case of a reported breakin at a site where system administrators discovered that their "safe baseline" was
actually the first to be attacked.

fsck, the program run at system boot that ensures
consistency between file data and their inodes. In
cases when file blocks cannot be bound to its file
name, they are placed in the lost+found directory and renamed to some (less than useful) number.
If a database of file signatures is available, this file
could be rebound to its original name by searching
the database for a matching signature.

Not coincidentally, Tripwire could be used effectively in such a role if software vendors supplied
a Tripwire-confonnant database with their distributions. The Tripwire database is suited for such a
purpose: it is ASCII, mostly human readable, simple to parse and construct (21 fixed fields), compact

Several site administrators have reported going to
considerable lengths to conceal the operation of Trip-

Because providing a useful tool to system administrators was one of the goals of writing Tripwire, the
variety of applications of Tripwire outside the doWe believe that operating system distributions, and main of intrusion detection has been especially surperhaps other software (e.g., compilers, system ad- prising and satisfying for us. We are still collecting
ministration tools), should be shipped with a com- other stories of novel use of the Tripwire package.
plete signature database. This information could then
be stored locally on some secure mediaor offline, and
4.2 Stealth-Tripwire
then used in the event of a suspected breakin.

6Brian Kernighan has said this, in one fonn or another, in
several of his presentations and written works. This particular
version was in private e-mail to one orus in response to acitation
request.
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wire. These system administrators feel strongly that ing the database and transmitting the report, adding
they should not advertise their security measures or layers for networking support, encryption, and host
policies.
authentication.
As a result, Tripwire is not being run through programs like cron (8), the conventional means of
executing programs on a regular schedule. Instead,
a wide variety of local tools are used. For example,
a special daemon might be loaded at system startup,
waking only to run Tripwire at a scheduled time.

Since its original release, we have added full suppan for using open UNIX file descriptors to read the
Tripwire configuration and database files. This allows system administrators to easily add support for
encryption and compression without having to modify the Tripwire package so drastically. Instead, a
wrapper program (even a shell script) can be used
to supply these facilities. Used with named pipes,
wrapper scripts in Perl or Tel, or simple network
clients this also allows centralized administration of
Tripwire checks in large installations.

Where cron is used, deception through indirection is sometimes used to prevent an intruder from
immediately detecting evidence of Tripwire operation. In one case, a system administrator uses three
levels of indirection before finally executing Tripwire (e.g., cron runs a script that runs a script than
It is interesting to note that mistrust of networked
runs a script that runs Tripwire).
file systems has motivated many of the enduserWe wonder whether these measures to conceal modifications to Tripwire. However, some of the
Tripwire are necessary, or even desirable. One of replacements we have have been told about sound as
us (Spafford) has heard of an ''underground'' publi- if they include other weaknesses. A sound, portable
cation warning of the need for special vigilance when solution to the problem has yet to appear.
attempting to crack systems running Tripwire. If this
warning is heeded, then the presence ofTripwire may 4.4 Paranoia is unbounded
have the ability to deter crackers. Advertising the use
of Tripwire (even if not true) could thus help avert The Tripwire design document recommends running
attacks.
Tripwire in integrity checking mode on a regular basis (e.g., daily) to ensure that file system tampering
can be detected in a timely manner.

4.3

Security is nice, if it's not too difficult

Because Tripwire reports are only as reliable as its
inputs, the design document stresses the need to ensure the integrity of the baseline database. Thus,
we suggest that the baseline database be moved to
some secure read-only media immediately after it is
is generated.

However, there have been two reported cases of
large sites running Tripwire far more frequently. In
fact, these experiences motivated the option of including a signature selection feature to allow skipping certain signatures by specifying choices on the
command line. Because these site admins were running Tripwire on their machines hourly with all signature checking enabled, the Tripwire runs were not
completed by the time the next Tripwire run started!

The most common Tripwireconfiguration reported
to us to facilitate this is the use of a "secure server," a
specialized server receiving extra scrutiny from adWe were left wondering what these machines did
ministrators. A remote file system or server process besides spending all the CPU cycles computing file
is then used to export the baseline database to clients. signatures. We also wonder why they placed so little
However, several sites have gone to much fur- faith in their other security measures, and what level
ther lengths to maintain the integrity of Tripwire of threat they were actually fearing.
databases. At least two sites have considerably modiIn contrast is the lack of use of an ideal Tripwirefied Tripwire to support alternate channels for receiv- aided bit of paranoia.
One of the ideas be-
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hind Tripwire's design (and the name itself) was
for system managers to scatter "plant" files on
their system, similar to what was done by Cliff
Stoll[I2]. These files would have interesting names
(e.g., master-passwords), but useless contents.
These files would not normally be accessed by users,
but might be prime targets for intruders. By monitoring these files as "mini-tripwires," it would be possible to detect an otherwise stealthy intrusion. We
have yet to hear of anyone using this scheme to good
effect.

4.5

Scalability includes sites large and small

When designing Tripwire, we were more concerned
about the problems facing system administrators at
large sites. Although design considerations were
made for these configurations, how Tripwire was
used at small sites was more surprising.
4.5.1

Mega-Tripwire

Tripwire has proven scalable, with documented
cases of sites of almost one thousand machines running Tripwire, as well as sites of only one machine.
That system administrators have done so using a
different mechanism than suggested in the design
document is especially interesting. That system administrators are not slavishly following our design
document is reassuring.
4.5.2

Micro-Tripwire

How Tripwire is used on workstations with minimal
disk resources proved surprisingly elegant. Although
the Tripwire configuration file allows considerable
flexibility in specifying files and directories to monitor, configuration files concocted by system administrators for these workstations consist of only one
character: "/"
Thusly, Tripwire scans all the local disk partitions
under the root directory, collecting the default MD5
and Snefru signatures. For some sites, this has proved
adequate for all their machines!

Tripwire provides a configuration language intended
to aid system administrators in managing larger sites.
4.6 Running 'Iripwire on the Sasquatch
We were especially interested in how these tools
Kumquat Mark VllaIMP
would be used by system administrators - the Tripwire design document suggests that a core configura- Tripwire has proven to be highly portable, successtion file could be shared by numerous hosts by using fully running on over 28 UNIX platforms. Among
the @@include directive.
them are Sun, SGI, HP, Sequents, Pyramids, Crays,
From reports we have gathered, this appears to be Apollos, NeXTs, BSDI, Lynix, Apple Macintosh,
a less than popular method. Instead, system admin- and even Xenix. Configurations for new operatistrators create one configuration file to be shared ing systems has proven to be sufficiently general
by all machines, using the @@ifhost directive to to necessitate the inclusion of only eight example
segregate non-common file groups.
tw. config files.
We suspect that the overhead of tracking multiple configuration files outweighs the inconvenience
caused by files obfuscated by many "@@ifdef"
statements. These shared configuration files are apparently still manageable, as the number of entries in
the file is usually not large. (We suspect that if files
had to be individually enumerated, these configuration files would be far larger, and therefore unmanageable.)
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However, potentially challenging situations result
when we receive requests from system administrators
asking for help compiling Tripwire on machines that
neither of us have ever heard of. In one case, this was
a machine only sold in Australia and shipped with in·
correct system libraries. Other instances included an
especially ignoble machine that has not been sold
since 1986 (predating college for of us), and numerous machines with non-standard compilers, libraries,

system calls, and shells.

on the design and coding of the Tripwire release, alIn all but two cases (of the last variety), we have though we realize that the code is rather opaque in
incorporated changes in Tripwire sources to accomo- many spots.
date these machines. In most cases, there has been
a sufficiently large group of system administrators 4.8 Static file systems aren't
with similarly orphaned machines who put together
a suitable patch to allow correct Tripwire compilation According to system administrators, the ability to upand operation.
date Tripwire databases is among its most important
It is interesting to analyze the time needed to fully features. Files seem to change for many unforeseen
support a configuration. Full support for Sun's new reasons. Consequently, the database is updated regSolaris operating system was added two months af- ularly. The addition of the interactive update facility
ter the initial Tripwire release. A workaround for in Tripwire was among the most enthusiastically rethe two afforementioned Australian machines was ceived features.
released six months after the problems were first reported. However, some Tripwire users running machines from a large workstation vendor continue to
be unable to find a compiler that correctly generates
a Tripwire that passes the entire test suite; investi·
gation has determined that this is because of nonstandard and broken compilers and libraries on those
platforms.

4.7

You added WHAT to Tripwire?

We recently recei ved a report from a user who is
adding support for Intel machines running UNIX to
allow Tripwire to check mounted MSDOS file systems. In such a manner, they are using Tripwire to
check not only UNIX file systems, but also their DOS
files (for viruses, etc.).

Allowing database updates was a feature that we
resisted for several months during the beta test period
in 1992. We believed (and still do, in part) that ease
of update may lead some administrators to be careless
in their storage of the database, thus weakening the
assurance Tripwire is capable of providing. That
users acquiesced and still used Tripwire despite its
lack of ability to update the baseline database without
regenerating the entire database astounds the authors
- in hindsight, at least.
5

Conclusions

Tripwire has proven to be a highly portable tool
that system administrators can build using commonly
available tools. It is completely self-contained, and
once built, requires no other tools for execution.
We also received, and are incorporating into a fuTripwire is publically available, is widely distributed,
ture Tripwire patch release, a set of changes to allow and widely used.
Tripwire to check the integrity of symbolic links - a
Tripwire has been used by system administrators
weakness noted in [13]. One novel and elegant soluin
large and small sites: we have documented Tription was implemented by storing the coments of the
7
symbolic link as a signature. Our actual solution wire's active use at single machine sites, as well as
will involve taking the signatures of the link field sites having several hundreds of machines. We have
yet to hear a report of a site where Tripwire was incontents.
stalled and then removed because it did not function
We are especially pleased that system administra- according to expectation, or because it was too diftors can so easily make feature additions that they ficult to build or maintain. Coupled with the many
perceive as necessary. We believe this reflects well positive comments we have received, and the fact
7This solution was proposed and implcmcmed by Paul Szabo that Tripwire has already caught several intruders,
oflhe University of Sydney.
leads us to conclude that our analysis and design are
12

successful. We hope this effort serves as a model
for others who consider building security tools with
similar goals.

[3] Daniel Farmer and Eugene H. Spafford. The
COPS security checker system. In Proceedings ofthe Summer Conference, pages 165-190,
Berkely, CA, 1990. Usenix Association.
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[4] Simson Garfinkel and Gene Spafford. Practical
Ullix Security. O'Reilly & Associates, Inc.,
Sebastopol, CA, 1991.

Availability

The beta version of Tripwire was made publically
available and posted to comp. sources. Wlix on
November 2, 1992 after three months of extensive
testing. Over three hundred users around the world
critiqued the four preliminary relellSes during Summer 1992, guiding the development towards a shippable, publically available tool. The formal release
of Tripwire occurred in December of 1993.
Tripwire source is available at no cost. 8 It has
appeared in comp. sources. Wlix (volume 26)
on Usenet, and is available via anonymous FTP
from many sites, including ftp . cs . purdue. edu
in pub/spaf/COAST/Tripwire. Those without Internet access can obtain infonnation on obtaining sources and patches via e-mail by mailing
to tripwire-request@cs.purdue.eduwith
the single word "help" in the message body.

[5] Brian W. Kernighan and Dennis M. Ritchie. The
M4 Macro Processor. AT&TBell Laboratories,
1977.
[6] Gene H. Kim and Eugene H. Spafford. The design and implementation of tripwire: A file system integrity checker. Technical Report CSDTR-93--Q7I, Purdue University, nov 1993.
[7] Gene H. Kim and Eugene H. Spafford. Monitoring file system integrity on unix platfonns.
InfoSecurity News, 4(4):21-22, July 1993.
[8] Gene H. Kim and Eugene H. Spafford. Experiences with tripwire: Using integrity checkers
for intrusion detection. In Systems Administration, Networking and Security Conference Ill.
Usenix, 1994.

We regret that we do not have the resources available to make tapes or diskette versions of Tripwire for
anyone other than COAST Project sponsors. Therefore, we IlSk that you not send us media for copiesit will not be returned.

[9] Ralph C. Merkle. A fast software one-way hash
function. Joumal of Cryptology, 3(1):43-58,
1990.
[10] R. L. Rivest. The md4 message digest algorithm. Advances in Cryptology - Crypto '90,
pages 303-311,1991.
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